How do people hold others responsible for the consequences of their actions? We propose a computational model that attributes responsibility as a function of what the observed action reveals about the person, and the causal role that the person's action played in bringing about the outcome. The model first infers what type of person someone is from having observed their action. It then compares a prior expectation of how a person would behave with a posterior expectation after having observed the person's action. The model predicts that a person is blamed for negative outcomes to the extent that the posterior expectation is lower than the prior, and credited for positive outcomes if the posterior is greater than the prior. We model the causal role of a person's action by using a counterfactual model that considers how close the action was to having been pivotal for the outcome. The model captures participants' responsibility judgments to a high degree of quantitative accuracy across three experiments that cover a range of different situations. It also solves an existing puzzle in the literature on the relationship between action expectations and responsibility judgments. Whether an unexpected action yields more or less credit depends on whether the action was diagnostic for good or bad future performance.
Introduction
In the quarter final of the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the Germany versus Argentina match came down to penalty shots. Unbeknownst to the Argentinian team, the German goalkeeper, Jens Lehmann, was handed a piece of paper that indicated where each of the Argentinian players was likely to shoot. Lehmann ended up saving two penalties, and the German team won the game. Clearly, Lehmann deserves credit for the team's win. But how much, and on what grounds?
Let us suppose that the following took place: Lehman was told that the first shooter often aims the ball at the left corner. Lehmann jumped to this corner and saved the ball. For the second shooter, Lehmann was told again to expect a shot in the left corner. However, this time Lehmann jumped in the opposite corner, and again saved the shot, even though his opponent kicked the ball in the unexpected direction. Would you give Lehmann more credit for the first, or the second save? And suppose Lehmann had failed to save both shots. Would you have blamed him more for failing to save the shot that went in the expected direction, or the unexpected one?
In this paper, we investigate how people hold others responsible for their actions. Most existing accounts predict that unexpected actions elicit greater attributions of responsibility than expected actions (Brewer, 1977; Fincham & Jaspars, 1983; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011) , and, more generally, that unexpected events are more likely to be cited as the cause of an outcome (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2015; Hart & Honoré, 1959 /1985 Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado, & Knobe, 2015) . However, recently Johnson and Rips (2015) reported a series of experiments in which participants held agents more responsible when positive outcomes resulted from expected actions. In their experiments, an agent faced a choice between multiple options that differed in their probability of bringing about a positive outcome. They found that participants held the agent more responsible for a positive outcome when the agent chose an option that was better than any of the alternatives, and less responsible when the agent chose an inferior option.
Together, these findings present a puzzle: When do we assign more responsibility for unexpected actions (as most theories predict), and when do we assign less responsibility? We present a computational model that solves this puzzle. The model relies on two processes: the first process is a dispositional inference that captures what an action reveals about a person. Specifically, we propose that a person will be credited (or blamed) to the degree that their action reveals they are the sort of person who will get things right (or wrong) in the future. 
